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FUNERAL PROTESTS, PRIVACY, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION:  WHAT IS NEXT AFTER 
PHELPS? 
MARK STRASSER  
In Snyder v. Phelps, the United States Supreme Court struck down a damages 
award against Reverend Fred Phelps Sr. and the Westboro Baptist Church for 
picketing a military funeral.  Although the Court asserted that its holding was narrow 
and the legal issues involved were straightforward, this Article argues that Phelps 
ultimately raises more questions than it answers and almost guarantees increased 
confusion in First Amendment jurisprudence.  The Court in Phelps explained that 
the First Amendment prohibits tort damages when the comments at issue involve 
matters of public concern, yet failed to explain whether private speech that was 
juxtaposed with public, political speech also warranted the protection of the First 
Amendment.  The Court also neglected to provide guidance on how its holding fits 
into the current defamation and privacy jurisprudence; in addition, it left 
unanswered pertinent questions about the constitutionality of a growing number of 
funeral protest statutes.  Lower courts are likely to feel frustrated by this decision and, 
consequently, a relatively clear area of the law is likely to become muddled. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Snyder v. Phelps,1 the United States Supreme Court issued a 
much-anticipated decision, striking down a damages award against 
Reverend Fred Phelps, Sr. and the Westboro Baptist Church for 
picketing the funeral of a Marine killed in Iraq.  In a relatively short 
opinion, the Court suggested that the legal issues were 
straightforward—the First Amendment precludes the imposition of 
tort damages when the comments at issue involve matters of public 
concern.2  Yet, the Court failed to explain whether comments that 
were not of public concern were somehow immunized by those that 
were.  The Court also failed to explain how the holding fits into 
current defamation and privacy jurisprudence.  The opinion raises 
more questions than it answers, and is sufficiently opaque that one 
cannot tell whether it marks a sea-change in the jurisprudence or, 
instead, is a straightforward application of it.  
Part I of this Article offers a brief discussion of the background 
behind Phelps and of the torts asserted by the father of Lance 
Corporal Matthew Snyder against Phelps and the Westboro Baptist 
Church.  Part II discusses the constitutional limitations imposed on 
torts involving defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional 
                                                          
 1. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 1215 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc., 472 U.S. 
749, 758–59 (1985)). 
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infliction of emotional distress that were recognized prior to Phelps.  
Part II also explains why these limitations might have cast light upon, 
but could not determine, the correct resolution of a case involving 
the imposition of damages for funeral picketing.  The Article 
concludes by explaining that although Phelps resolved very little, it 
nonetheless almost guarantees increased confusion in First 
Amendment jurisprudence.   
I. THE FUNERAL AND THE POSSIBLE TORTS IMPLICATED 
Matthew Snyder’s funeral was picketed by a group protesting, 
among other things, Catholicism and equality policies across the 
country.3  That same group posted various hurtful comments about 
Snyder on their website; as a result, Albert Snyder—the father of the 
deceased Marine—sued the group, asserting various claims in tort.4  
While some of these claims were found to be without merit as a 
matter of law, others were left to the jury to decide, resulting in a 
substantial verdict.5  This section includes a brief discussion of the 
background of the case and the various tort theories asserted. 
A. Background 
On March 3, 2006, Matthew Snyder died fighting for his country in 
Iraq.6  A notice regarding the time and place of the funeral was 
placed in local papers in Westminster, Maryland.7  Five days later, 
Phelps, the pastor of the Westboro Baptist Church, became aware of 
the funeral and issued a news release announcing that he and his 
family would picket the funeral.8 
The plaintiff and the defendants differed on why the funeral was 
being picketed.  The defendants said that they “traveled to Matthew 
Snyder’s funeral to publicize their message of God’s hatred of 
                                                          
 3. See id. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the Phelps family had 
discussed, among other issues, “homosexuality, the Catholic Church, and the United 
States military”). 
 4. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (D. Md. 2008) (noting that the 
case proceeded to trial on the issues of intrusion upon seclusion, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 
2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 5. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1214 (“A jury found for Snyder on the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy claims, 
and held Westboro liable for $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million 
in punitive damages.”).  The district court reduced the punitive damages award to 
$2.1 million.  Id. 
 6. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 571. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
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America for its tolerance of homosexuality.”9  The defendants 
admitted that “their picketing efforts gained increased attention 
when they began to picket funerals of soldiers killed in recent 
years.”10  Albert Snyder argued that the defendants transformed the 
“funeral for his son into a ‘media circus for their benefit.’”11 
The defendants picketed the funeral at a location that was in 
accord with local law and police instructions.12  Phelps and his family 
held up several signs, some of which expressed general points of view, 
such as “God Hates the USA,” “America is doomed,” “Pope in hell,” 
and “Fag troops.”13  However, some of the other signs could have 
been construed as having been directed at Matthew Snyder and his 
parents,14 such as “You are going to hell”15 and “God hates you.”16  By 
the same token, while some of the comments on the Westboro Baptist 
Church website might have been characterized as generalized 
opinions about the United States,17 others might have been perceived 
as being directed at the family in particular,18 for example that 
“Matthew Snyder was raised for the devil and was taught to defy 
God.”19  
Albert Snyder only became aware of the signs that had been near 
his son’s funeral after the funeral had taken place.20  Later still, he 
became aware of the comments that the Westboro Church published 
on their website in an “epic” about his son.21  
Snyder testified that he suffered great harm as a result of the 
picketing and posting of the epic on the Church’s website.22  Expert 
testimony corroborated the long-lasting and detrimental effects 
                                                          
 9. Id. at 571–72. 
 10. Id. at 571. 
 11. Id. at 572. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 578. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. 
 17. For example, a later posting on their site makes the more general claim that 
God is killing our soldiers out of wrath. See News Release, Westboro Baptist Church, 
God Hates America & is Killing Our Troops in His Wrath (May 12, 2011), 
http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110512_Dead-Soldiers-MI-Friese-OR-Lara.pdf 
(“GOD HATES AMERICA & IS KILLING OUR TROOPS IN HIS WRATH.”). 
 18. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 578. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. at 572 (explaining that Snyder was unaware of the content of the 
signage used by the Church “until he saw a television program later that day with 
footage of the Phelps family at his son’s funeral”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. (describing Snyder’s reaction to the epic, which included vomiting and 
weeping). 
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caused by the church members’ actions.23  The issue at hand was 
whether the Phelps family could be held liable in tort for the injury 
that their speech had caused.  
B. Tort Law 
The comments on the protesters’ signs and the church’s website 
potentially implicated a number of tort-related issues, including 
whether Matthew Snyder and his parents had been defamed.  Yet, 
there are a number of reasons why a defamation action under these 
circumstances was unlikely to succeed.  First, in many states, a 
defamation action cannot be brought on behalf of an individual who 
is deceased,24 so such an action could not be maintained on behalf of 
Matthew Snyder by his father.  If the claim was that the parents had 
been defamed, it would then be necessary to determine the content 
of the allegedly defamatory statements.  Suppose, for example, that 
the defendants’ comments were construed as merely suggesting, in 
an admittedly offensive way, that the Snyders had raised their son as a 
Catholic.25  In that event, the comments would not be defamatory.26 
Another tort claim asserted unsuccessfully by Albert Snyder was 
that Phelps wrongfully made private facts public.27  The district court 
rejected this claim, at least in part, because the information revealed 
was already a matter of public record.28 
While the trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment with respect to defamation and publication of private facts, 
the court permitted the jury to decide Snyder’s claims of intrusion 
                                                          
 23. Id. 
 24. See Johnson v. KTBS, Inc., 889 So. 2d 329, 332 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (“Once a 
person is dead, there is no extant reputation to injure or for the law to protect.”); 
Channel 4, KGBT v. Briggs, 759 S.W.2d 939, 940 n.1 (Tex. 1988) (noting that a cause 
of action cannot be brought “for the defamation of a person already dead”); see also 
Gruschus v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 342 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1965) (explaining that 
the common law did not permit the reflection “in the reputation of another[,]” and 
thus “the action did not survive the death of the defamed party”); Fitch v. Voit, No. 
CV 92-063, 1993 WL 141588, at *5 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1993) (observing that Alabama’s 
“survival statute” made no allowance for a libel action brought by the surviving 
relative of the defamed dead), aff’d, 624 So. 2d 542 (Ala. 1993). 
 25. The signs included “Pope in Hell,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates 
You.”  Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 223–24 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 
(2011).  The “epic” included the comment, “[The Snyders] also, in supporting 
satanic Catholicism, taught Matthew to be an idolater.”  Id. at 225.  These all might 
be understood to be condemning the Snyders for having raised Matthew as a 
Catholic. 
 26. Cf. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572–73 (observing that there was no defamatory 
communication because the posted “epic” was “Phelps-Roper’s religious opinion”). 
 27. See id. at 572 ( (noting that this was one of Snyder’s claims). 
 28. Id. at 573 (noting that the allegedly private facts were already a matter of 
public record). 
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upon seclusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil 
conspiracy.29  The jury found for the plaintiff on all three, although it 
was unclear whether Snyder met his burden of proof on any of these 
claims under existing state law.30  
Consider the damages awarded for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  To successfully bring an intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
‘defendant[s], intentionally or recklessly, engaged in extreme and 
outrageous conduct that caused the plaintiff to suffer severe 
emotional distress.’”31  
Extreme and outrageous conduct involves a standard that is by no 
means easy to meet.32  There are numerous cases in which individuals 
have engaged in objectionable conduct that nonetheless did not 
meet the relevant standard.33  That said, however, there are a number 
of cases recognizing that individuals are particularly vulnerable when 
there has been a death in the family,34 and may be even more 
vulnerable when attending a funeral,35 so behavior that is typically not 
                                                          
 29. See id. (determining that these three claims raised genuine issues of material 
fact). 
 30. See Phelps, 580 F.3d at 227 (Shedd, J., concurring) (positing that Snyder failed 
to provide “sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict on any of his tort claims”). 
 31. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 580 (citing Miller v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 121 F. 
Supp. 2d 831, 839 (D. Md. 2000)). 
 32. But see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300, 300-01 (2010) (explaining 
that outrageousness is a subjective standard that can be perceived differently by 
“some judge, jury, university administrator, or other government actor”). 
 33. See Crockett v. Essex, 19 S.W.3d 585, 590 (Ark. 2000) (admonishing a funeral 
home and its director for conduct that was “rude and illustrative of a lack of 
professionalism,” but declining to hold that such conduct was “so extreme and 
outrageous as to be beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be utterly 
intolerable in a civilized society”); Stahl v. Health Alliance Plan, No. 179879, 1996 
WL 33323984, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Tope v. Howe, 445 N.W.2d 452 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989)) (dismissing a “crass and insensitive” claim for failing to “rise 
to the level of extreme and outrageous” because “mere insults, indignities . . . and 
other trivialities” could not warrant liability); see also Phelps, 580 F.3d at 232 (Shedd, 
J., concurring) (contending that, whatever the propriety of the Phelps’ protest, “this 
conduct simply does not satisfy the heavy burden required for the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress under Maryland law”). 
 34. See, e.g., Thomas v. Hosp. Bd. of Dirs. of Lee Cnty., 41 So. 3d 246, 256 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (declaring that “the action of providing false information 
concerning the loved one’s cause of death meets the standard for a claim of outrage 
(intentional infliction of emotional distress)” because of the heightened sensitivity of 
the survivor to emotional distress). 
 35. See, e.g., Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 372 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing the Funeral Protest Provision, which had the purpose of protecting 
funeral attendees from “the harmful psychological effects of unwanted 
communication when they are most captive and vulnerable”); Thomas, 41 So. 3d at 
256  (explaining that “the appellees’ conduct in making false statements—which led 
to the interruption of Mildred Thomas’s funeral and the return of her body for a 
second, more thorough autopsy—rises to the level of atrocious and utterly 
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thought of as extreme and outrageous might be found to be so in the 
special circumstances surrounding the death of a loved one.36  
Even in instances in which the behavior at issue is beyond all 
possible bounds of decency, a separate question is whether the injury 
itself is sufficiently severe to meet the requirements of the tort.37  
Even if the degree of severity can be established, the plaintiff must 
show that it was the defendant’s action, rather than something else, 
that caused the harm.  For example, it might be argued that Snyder’s 
harm was more aptly attributed to the loss of his son than to the 
actions of the Phelps family.38  In this case, however, testimony 
established that the defendants’ actions “had a significant impact,”39 
causing the plaintiff to suffer “‘severe and specific’ injuries.”40  
The Fourth Circuit did not address whether Snyder met his burden 
under state law because the defendants had not addressed that issue 
on appeal41 and were held to have waived that basis for challenging 
the award.42  The appellate court instead examined whether the First 
Amendment precluded the imposition of liability under any of the 
tort theories asserted,43 ultimately concluding that the imposition of 
tort damages in this case was precluded by constitutional 
guarantees.44  Snyder petitioned for certiorari, and the United States 
                                                          
intolerable behavior which cannot be condoned in a civilized community”); see also 
Alan Brownstein & Vikram David Amar, Death, Grief, and Freedom of Speech:  Does the 
First Amendment Permit Protection Against the Harassment and Commandeering of Funeral 
Mourners?, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 368, 370 (2010) (discussing “the unique 
vulnerability of audience members in special locations and times such as funerals, 
and the uniquely demeaning way in which these funeral hecklers were trying to use 
the mourners as stage props rather than an audience”). 
 36. Cf. Brownstein & Amar, supra note 35, at 377–78 (arguing that courts 
frequently recognize recovery under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress for deliberate interference with funerals).  
 37. See, e.g., Dale v. Thomas Funeral Home, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 805, 808 (Neb. 
1991) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
because even though the plaintiff was “perturbed, worried, and upset,” she failed to 
demonstrate that her emotional distress was so severe that no reasonable person 
could endure it). 
 38. See Volokh, supra note 32, at 309 (“It seems unlikely that [the speech at issue] 
would much exacerbate the father’s grief—a  grief that stems from his son’s death, 
not from the speech of a small minority of hateful, anti-American kooks and publicity 
hounds.”). 
 39. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d. 567, 580 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 
(4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 40. Id. at 580–81. 
 41. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 216 (4th Cir. 2009) (observing that “the 
Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence”), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 
(2011). 
 42. Id.  
 43. See id. at 218 (declaring that the First Amendment could be invoked as a 
defense against a plaintiff seeking “damages for reputational, mental, or emotional 
injury allegedly resulting from the defendant’s speech”). 
 44. Id. at 226. 
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Supreme Court took up the case to address whether, under the First 
Amendment, “Westboro must be shielded from tort liability for its 
picketing in this case.”45 
II. TORT DAMAGES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Cases like Phelps, where tort claims and the First Amendment 
intersect, raise two important inquiries.  One issue involves whether a 
particular plaintiff has met his burden with respect to establishing all 
the elements of the tort claims asserted.  Even if a plaintiff meets 
those state tort law requirements, a separate issue is whether the 
United States Constitution will allow the plaintiff to recover damages.  
As this portion of the Article will demonstrate, the constitutional 
jurisprudence in this area is far from clear, which is one reason the 
Phelps decision was greatly anticipated.46 
A. The Developing Defamation Jurisprudence 
When attempting to determine whether the speech at issue in 
Phelps is constitutionally protected, one should consider the 
jurisprudence in several related areas.  The inquiry should begin by 
examining defamation jurisprudence. While defamation cases do not 
address all the issues raised in Phelps, this jurisprudence might 
nonetheless cast light on how this  case should be decided because 
the defamation case law is more developed and has been used to 
inform constitutional limitations imposed on other related torts.47 
1. Public officials, public figures, and defamation  
The Court established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan48 that a 
public official cannot recover “damages for a defamatory falsehood 
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement 
was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was 
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”49  An 
important purpose of the opinion was to preclude “the possibility 
                                                          
 45. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1212 (2011). 
 46. See generally Sean Gregory, Inside the Supreme Court’s Free Speech Showdown, TIME 
(Oct. 6, 2010) http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2024062,00.html 
(suggesting that Snyder v. Phelps had received more public attention than any other 
Supreme Court case that term). 
 47. See Howard C. Nielson, Jr., Comment, Recklessly False Statements in the Public-
Employment Context, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1277, 1297 (1996) (discussing “the Supreme 
Court’s well developed body of defamation jurisprudence”). 
 48. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 49. Id. at 279–80.  
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that a good-faith critic of government will be penalized for his 
criticism.”50 
In Garrison v. Louisiana,51 the Court explained why the actual 
malice standard should be employed in cases involving an alleged 
defamation of a public official.  Where the “criticism is of public 
officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private 
reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the 
Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”52  Even where false 
claims had indeed been made, the Constitution prohibits “attaching 
adverse consequences to any [such claims] except [those made with] 
knowing or reckless falsehood.”53  Were a different standard used, 
such as common law actual malice, then a speaker who honestly 
believed that a public official engaged in wrongdoing might be 
deterred from speaking out, because she might fear that her dislike 
of the official might be established in court and somehow used to 
impose liability for the expression of sincerely held (but possibly 
mistaken) beliefs.  Use of the common law malice standard might 
thus undermine the free exchange of ideas and the discovery of 
truth.54  
An individual who asserts her sincerely held but mistaken belief 
about a public official might spur an investigation, which might lead 
to the discovery of the truth about the official or, perhaps, about the 
wrongdoing incorrectly attributed to the official.  Yet, the same point 
might be made about an individual who makes statements that she 
knows to be false—these statements might also spur an investigation 
and discovery of the truth.  Nonetheless, the Court rejected that the 
twin rationales of promoting the free exchange of ideas and the 
discovery of truth should also justify immunizing assertions of known 
falsehoods.55  The Court’s rejection reflected its belief that that the 
knowing falsehood was of such little value that it did not enjoy 
constitutional protection.56  
                                                          
 50. Id. at 292. 
 51. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
 52. Id. at 72–73. 
 53. Id. at 73. 
 54. See id. (“Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must 
run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did 
speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange 
of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.”). 
 55. See id. at 75 (noting that an “honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further 
the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech,” but that “it does not follow that the 
lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like 
immunity”). 
 56. See id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) 
(categorizing calculated falsehoods as “fall[ing] into that class of utterances which 
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The Court later expanded the scope of the protections discussed in 
New York Times beyond public officials to include public figures, 
explaining that public figures command “sufficient continuing public 
interest and ha[ve] sufficient access to the means of 
counterargument to be able ‘to expose through discussion the 
falsehood and fallacies’ of the defamatory statements.”57  Public 
figures, like public officials, have access to the media and will be 
afforded the opportunity to rebut false statements made about them.  
Because public figures are afforded a forum where they can deny 
false accusations and attempt to undo the damage resulting from 
false assertions, there is less of a need to afford them the opportunity 
to receive tort damages to compensate them for the wrong associated 
with false accusations that damage reputation.  Because that is so, tort 
damages can be reserved for the most egregious kinds of defamatory 
statements, e.g., those that are asserted notwithstanding the speaker’s 
knowledge or strong suspicion that the statements are false. 
a. Demonstrating actual malice 
The actual malice standard is a daunting one.  To show that the 
defendant published false statements with actual malice, there “must 
be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in 
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.”58  
In St. Amant v. Thompson,59 the Court offered some examples in which 
a jury might reasonably conclude that the defendant had not believed 
the truth of his allegation.60  The Court explained that “[p]rofessions 
of good faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for example, where 
a story is fabricated by the defendant [and] is the product of his 
imagination.”61  Of course, even in the extreme case of a fabricated 
story, matters may not be so clear-cut.  For example, notwithstanding 
an inability to uncover the relevant evidence, an individual might still 
be certain that a public official has committed wrongdoing.  That 
individual might express her sincere suspicions, both because she 
believes them and because she hopes that others will step forward to 
                                                          
‘are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as 
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed 
by the social interest in order and morality’”). 
 57. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (citing Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
 58. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
 59. 390 U.S. 727 (1968). 
 60. Id. at 732. 
 61. See id. at 732 (adding that an assertion of good faith is also inadequate when a 
story is based entirely on an unverified, anonymous telephone call, or when the 
allegations made are so improbable as to be reckless). 
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help substantiate the accusations. 
Suppose that an individual publicly expresses her suspicions about 
an official’s wrongdoing, undeterred by the lack of hard evidence to 
substantiate those allegations.  Suppose further that the official has in 
fact been falsely accused and has thereby suffered harm.  One might 
say that anyone who publishes an accusation without substantiation 
should be potentially liable for any harm that might be caused.  
While that would be a possible position, it does not reflect the 
current system in the United States, because such a system would 
likely have the undesirable effect of greatly chilling speech.62  This 
reflects the Court’s fear that a rule that “compels a publisher or 
broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may 
lead to intolerable self-censorship.”63  
Use of the actual malice standard is intended to limit the degree to 
which publishers or broadcasters engage in voluntary self-censorship.  
As long as the publisher neither knows that the statement at issue is 
false nor has a reckless disregard for its truth, the publisher will not 
be held liable for false and possibly defamatory statements about a 
public figure.64 
b. Proving recklessness as actual malice  
The recklessness prong requires further explication.  The St. Amant 
Court explained that “recklessness may be found where there are 
obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the 
accuracy of his reports.”65  However, the Court was not suggesting that 
recklessness will be established whenever there is good reason to 
believe that the official has been wrongly accused.  To the contrary, 
“reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent 
man would have published, or would have investigated before 
publishing.”66  Instead, there must be “sufficient evidence to permit 
the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts 
as to the truth of his publication.”67  Thus, the recklessness prong of 
the actual malice standard will not be met merely by showing that a 
reasonable person would not have been confident that the claims at 
                                                          
 62. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (explaining that 
punishing an erroneous statement would “run[]the risk of inducing a cautious and 
restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and 
press”). 
 63. Id.  
 64. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1969) (stating that 
the Constitution requires an actual malice standard). 
 65. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732. 
 66. Id. at 731. 
 67. Id. 
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issue were accurate.68  Even the recklessness prong of the actual 
malice standard is quite difficult to meet. 
2. Private actors and defamation:  The Rosenbloom standard 
In both New York Times69 and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,70 the 
Court emphasized that the actual malice standard should be used 
when allegedly defamatory comments have been made about a public 
figure.71  However, the actual malice standard was also used in a case 
in which a private figure was allegedly defamed while matters of 
public concern were being addressed.  In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 
Inc.,72 the Court considered “whether the New York Times’ knowing-or-
reckless-falsity standard applie[d] in a state civil libel action brought 
not by a ‘public official’ or a ‘public figure’ but by a private individual 
for a defamatory falsehood uttered in a news broadcast by a radio 
station about the individual’s involvement in an event of public or 
general interest.”73  George Rosenbloom argued that a broadcast 
claiming that he was arrested for selling obscene materials was false 
and defamatory, as established by his subsequent acquittal.74  
While “the police campaign to enforce the obscenity laws was an 
issue of public interest,”75 an important issue was whether 
Rosenbloom’s status as a private citizen would lower the requisite 
threshold to impose damages for the broadcast of libelous comments.  
The Rosenbloom plurality responded in the negative, reasoning that “if 
a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly 
become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or 
because in some sense the individual did not ‘voluntarily’ choose to 
become involved.”76  Because that is so, the plaintiff’s “prior 
anonymity or notoriety” 77 is of secondary importance. 
Yet, the justifications for applying the actual malice standard in 
cases involving public figures do not seem as applicable in cases 
involving private figures.  A private figure might not have the same 
kind of access to the media as would a public figure, which would 
                                                          
 68. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279 (declining to adopt a rule requiring a 
critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of his assertions). 
 69. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 70. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
 71. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279–
80. 
 72. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion), abrogated by Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
 73. Id. at 31–32. 
 74. Id. at 36. 
 75. Id. at 40. 
 76. Id. at 43. 
 77. Id. 
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make it harder for the plaintiff to counter the allegedly false and 
defamatory claims.78  A private individual also does not assume the 
risk public figures take that others might publish negative and 
possibly defamatory statements.79 
The Rosenbloom plurality offered a somewhat surprising response to 
the claim that public and private figures were distinguishable.  The 
plurality essentially pointed out that some public figures also do not 
have access to the media because such access might depend upon the 
“media’s continuing interest in the story.”80  The Court further noted 
that even in those instances in which public figures were accorded 
access to the media, they may be unable to undo the damage.81  
Rather than permitting tort damages to be awarded when defamatory 
statements are negligently made about a private figure, the plurality 
suggested that states instead should simply assure that such 
individuals would have access to the media to correct the inaccurate 
assertions,82 notwithstanding the plurality’s own point that such access 
might well prove unavailing. 
The argument that private figures should also be afforded access to 
the media does not address the rationale that public figures 
voluntarily enter into the limelight and thus should have less access 
to tort damages for defamatory statements made about them.83  The 
plurality offered two observations about such a claim.  First, it 
characterized the “idea that certain ‘public’ figures have voluntarily 
exposed their entire lives to public inspection, while private 
individuals have kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view” as a 
legal fiction.84  The plurality also feared that emphasizing the 
distinction between public figures and private individuals might have 
the “paradoxical result of dampening discussion of issues of public or 
general concern because they happen to involve private citizens while 
extending constitutional encouragement to discussion of aspects of 
                                                          
 78. Id. at 45–46 (reasoning that even some lesser-known public figures do not 
command the same media attention as public figures that are very prominent). 
 79. Id. at 45 (noting that the petitioner, in seeking a lower threshold to impose 
damages, argued that the private individual “has not assumed the risk of defamation 
by thrusting himself into the public arena”). 
 80. Id. at 46. 
 81. See id. (explaining that “[d]enials, retractions, and corrections are not ‘hot’ 
news” as they “rarely receive the prominence of the original story”). 
 82. Id. at 47 (“If the States fear that private citizens will not be able to respond 
adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction of ensuring 
their ability to respond, rather than in stifling public discussion of matters of public 
concern.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 48. 
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the lives of ‘public figures’ that are not in the area of public or 
general concern.”85 
One difficulty with the Rosenbloom rationale is that the plurality 
seemed to undercut the justification for using the actual malice 
standard even in cases involving public figures.  Suppose the 
Rosenbloom plurality is correct that public figures are not accurately 
thought to have assumed the risk that they would be publicly 
subjected to possibly false and unfair criticism.86  Suppose further that 
the plurality is correct to doubt that public figures have enhanced 
access to the media and that they will be able to repair reputational 
damage even when they are accorded that access.87  In that event, it 
would seem inaccurate to claim that public figures generally can 
adequately defend themselves and thus do not need the tort system 
for compensation for injury to their reputations.  
3. Rejecting Rosenbloom:   easing  defamation requirements  for private 
 individuals 
In any event, as the Court subsequently made clear,88 the Rosenbloom 
plurality position was rejected in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.89  At issue in 
Gertz was a published article that contained serious and defamatory 
inaccuracies about the plaintiff, Elmer Gertz.90  The magazine editor 
denied any knowledge that the allegations in the article were false 
and, further, claimed to have relied on the author’s reputation and 
                                                          
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 47–48. 
 87. Id. at 46–47. 
 88. This clarification was best expressed in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 
448 (1976), where the Court observed that: 
Were we to accept [that mere interest to the public qualifies an issue as a 
public controversy], we would reinstate the doctrine advanced in the 
plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), which 
concluded that the New York Times privilege should be extended to 
falsehoods defamatory of private persons whenever the statements concern 
matters of general or public interest. In Gertz, however, the Court repudiated 
this position, stating that “extension of the New York Times test proposed by 
the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge [a] legitimate state interest to a 
degree that we find unacceptable.”  
Id. at 454 (citing Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974)); see also W. Wat 
Hopkins, Snyder v. Phelps, Private Persons and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress:  
A Chance for the Supreme Court to Set Things Right, 9 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 149, 
162 (2010) (explaining that the theory that the First Amendment “requires a 
heightened burden of proof in tort actions related to matters of public concern[,]” 
notwithstanding “the public private or status of a plaintiff[,] is contrary to the 
holdings of the Supreme Court”). 
 89. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 90. See id. at 326 (describing the false claims about Gertz, including that he was a 
criminal, a Communist, and involved in the attack on the Chicago police that 
occurred during the 1968 Democratic Convention). 
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on the author’s history of submitting accurate articles.91  Reliance on 
reputation was part of the justification for refusing to hold the 
publisher liable in New York Times,92 and one of the issues that arose in 
Gertz was whether the New York Times standard was applicable in a 
defamation suit brought by a plaintiff who was a private individual.93  
While a libel award to a private individual was struck down in 
Rosenbloom, no controlling rationale existed in that opinion.94 
The Gertz Court found the Rosenbloom plurality’s rationale 
unpersuasive and refused to extend the New York Times First 
Amendment protections to cases involving private individuals.  The 
Court then analyzed how defamation involving a private individual 
should be approached.  
The Gertz Court explained that under the First Amendment “there 
is no such thing as a false idea,”95  and that no matter how “pernicious 
an opinion may seem, its correction should be founded upon “the 
competition of other ideas,” not the “conscience of judges and 
juries.”96  However, the Court reasoned that “there is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact[,]” as “[n]either the 
intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s 
interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public 
issues.”97  Not only are such statements viewed as lacking in value, but 
they are not even viewed as instrumentally likely to lead to the 
discovery or reinforcement of truth.98  The Court classified such 
statements as “belong[ing] to that category of utterances which ‘are 
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.’”99  
                                                          
 91. Id. at 328. 
 92. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964).   
 93. Id. at 332 (“The principal issue in this case is whether a newspaper or 
broadcaster that publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither 
a public official nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against 
liability for the injury inflicted by those statements.”). 
 94. Id. at 333; see also Leslie C. Griffin, Snyder v. Phelps:  Searching for a Legal 
Standard, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 353, 357 (2010) (arguing that the Court 
“never adopted the Rosenbloom plurality’s standard” and that instead, “defamation law 
became linked to some mixture of public and private figures with public and private 
concerns”). 
 95. See Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 339 (detailing the different opinions 
contained in Rosenbloom and their inability to be reconciled with one another). 
 96. Id. at 339–40. 
 97. Id. at 340 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 98. Id. at 340. 
 99. Id. at 339–40 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
(1942)). 
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Rejecting the Rosenbloom emphasis on whether the issue at hand 
was a matter of public concern, the Gertz Court instead reaffirmed the 
importance of considering the type of individual who had allegedly 
been defamed.100  The Court believed that upholding a heightened 
standard for public figures “administers an extremely powerful 
antidote to the inducement to media self-censorship.”101  However, 
affording robust protections of free expression concerning public 
figures has a downside; namely, “it exacts a correspondingly high 
price from the victims of defamatory falsehood,”102 because “many 
deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury, 
will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York Times test.”103  
The Court viewed the constitutional guarantees of free expression as 
involving a balancing on the one hand of the “interest of the press 
and broadcast media in immunity from liability”104 and on the other 
of the “limited state interest present in the context of libel actions 
brought by public persons.”105  The Court then suggested that “the 
state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private 
individuals requires that a different rule should obtain with respect to 
them.”106 
It might seem surprising that the state’s interest would differ 
depending on the nature of the individual allegedly defamed.107  
However, to justify this dichotomy, the Court reaffirmed the pre-
Rosenbloom rationale that “public figures usually enjoy significantly 
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence 
have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements 
[than] private individuals normally enjoy.”108  Precisely because public 
figures and private individuals are dissimilar with respect to their 
ability to engage in self-help, private individuals are “more vulnerable 
                                                          
 100. See id. at 342 (“Those who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or 
the vigor and success with which they seek the public’s attention, are properly classed 
as public figures and those who hold governmental office may recover for injury to 
reputation only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was 
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 343. 
 105. Id. (emphasis added). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See generally Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (recognizing a 
“pervasive and strong [state] interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon 
reputation”); id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The right of a man to the 
protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects 
no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human 
being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”). 
 108. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
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to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly 
greater.”109  
The Court offered another reason to distinguish between these two 
types of plaintiffs besides their differing abilities to access the media 
to counter defamatory claims, namely, that public scrutiny naturally 
follows deliberate exposure to the public limelight.110  In contrast, the 
private individual “has relinquished no part of his interest in the 
protection of his own good name, and consequently, he has a more 
compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by 
defamatory falsehood.”111  The Court concluded its discussion by 
noting that “private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury 
than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving 
of recovery.”112 
Because the Court concluded that public and private plaintiffs 
occupied different legal positions, it rejected the Rosenbloom analysis, 
concluding that “the States should retain substantial latitude in their 
efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious 
to the reputation of a private individual.”113  Had the Court held that 
any defamatory assertions involving a matter of public interest were 
subject to the actual malice standard, then “a private individual whose 
reputation [was] injured by defamatory falsehood that [did] concern 
an issue of public or general interest [would have] no recourse unless 
he [could] meet the rigorous requirements of New York Times.”114  But 
this would not permit the state to offer adequate protection for the 
reputations of private individuals.  To accomplish that particular 
objective, the Gertz Court held that “so long as they do not impose 
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the 
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of 
defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”115 
At least with respect to defamation, the current jurisprudence does 
not solely focus on whether the matter at issue is of public or private 
concern.  Instead, other factors are also considered, including the 
type of individual who was allegedly victimized.  It was thus surprising 
that the Phelps Court concluded that the question of whether the 
                                                          
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (observing that an individual seeking governmental office “must accept 
certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs” and “runs the 
risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case”).   
 111. Id. at 345. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 345–46. 
 114. Id. at 346. 
 115. Id. at 347–48. 
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“First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its 
speech . . . turn[ed] largely on whether that speech is of public or 
private concern”116 and that liability could not be imposed because, as 
a nation, we have chosen to “protect even hurtful speech on public 
issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”117  Such an 
oversimplified view neither reflects the current state of defamation 
jurisprudence nor First Amendment jurisprudence more generally. 
B. Constitutional Limitations on Other Torts 
One reason that Phelps is somewhat difficult to analyze is that there 
is no case on point.  While there is a developing defamation 
jurisprudence, the damage award in Phelps was not based on injury to 
reputation, but instead on injury resulting from the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.118  There have been a number of 
other cases in which the Court has attempted to establish the 
constitutional limits imposed on recovery for related kinds of torts, 
although the core issues in those cases are distinguishable in 
important ways from the issues implicated in Phelps.  This portion of 
the Article discusses those cases and their potential applicability to 
Phelps.  
1. The actual malice standard and the tort of intentional infliction of 
 emotional distress 
Consider one of the Court’s classic cases involving intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,119 which 
involved a suit by the fundamentalist preacher Jerry Falwell against 
Larry Flynt’s Hustler Magazine.  At issue was a parody of a Campari 
advertisement in which Falwell was depicted as describing his “first 
time” with his mother in an outhouse.120  The magazine labeled the 
advertisement as a parody,121 and it was not thought to be making any 
factual claims.122  Nonetheless, Falwell found the parody offensive, 
and Hustler’s satire was perceived as “doubtless[ly] gross and 
repugnant in the eyes of most.”123 
The Falwell Court noted that “the law does not regard the intent to 
                                                          
 116. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011). 
 117. Id. at 1220. 
 118. See id. at 1214 (noting that the trial court held that there was no defamation 
as a matter of law). 
 119. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 120. Id. at 48. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 50 (noting that the “speech could not reasonably have been interpreted 
as stating actual facts about the public figure involved”). 
 123. Id. 
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inflict emotional distress as one which should receive much 
solicitude, and it is quite understandable that most if not all 
jurisdictions have chosen to make it civilly culpable where the 
conduct in question is sufficiently ‘outrageous.’”124  Nonetheless, the 
Court also cautioned that “in the world of debate about public affairs, 
many things done with motives that are less than admirable are 
protected by the First Amendment.”125  As a result, some 
commentators have suggested that Falwell should be understood to 
immunize discussions about public affairs from tort liability even if 
such discussions are about a private individual, as long as actual 
malice cannot be established.126  However, when the Court’s 
comments are considered in context, a less robust interpretation 
seems more plausible.127 
One of the concerns that militated in favor of striking down the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress award against Hustler 
Magazine was the malleability of the outrageousness standard.128  As 
the Falwell Court explained, “‘Outrageousness’ in the area of political 
and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which 
would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes 
or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular 
expression.”129  Because of this malleability, the Court imposed the 
actual malice requirement for claims made by “public figures and 
public officials [such as Falwell] . . . for the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications [such as 
Hustler Magazine’s satirical advertisement].”130  It is simply unclear 
whether, as a constitutional matter, the Court’s refusal to uphold an 
award on the basis of outrageous political or social discourse should 
be understood to be limited to contexts involving public figures or 
whether, instead, that concern has a much broader reach.   
Like Phelps,131 Falwell was argued in the Fourth Circuit.132  When the 
                                                          
 124. Id. at 53. 
 125. Id.  
 126. See Volokh, supra note 32, at 304–05 (explaining that defamatory statements 
are often equally as offensive to private figures as public ones, although only 
negligently made).   
 127. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the Open 
Texture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 491 (2011) (criticizing the “Falwell-based 
defense of the Phelpses’ position” because it was not a “tenable reading” of the 
Court’s decision in that case).  
 128. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. at 56 (describing actual malice as having “knowledge that the 
statement was false” or making a statement with “reckless disregard as to whether or 
not it was true”). 
 131. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).   
 132. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), rev’d sub nom. Hustler 
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Fourth Circuit analyzed whether the award against Hustler Magazine 
should be upheld, the court recognized that Falwell was a public 
figure and that the New York Times standard would play some role.133  
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit attempted to apply the actual malice 
standard in the context of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.134  However, the court rejected “the literal application of the 
actual malice standard”135 as inappropriate; under such a literal 
application, liability could only attach if the parody was published 
notwithstanding the publisher’s knowledge that the parody was false 
or made with reckless disregard for its truth.136  Were that the 
standard, Hustler Magazine certainly would have not been liable 
because it made no assertions of fact, much less assertions of fact that 
were tortious in light of the actual malice standard.137 
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that requiring a plaintiff to “prove 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth in an action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress would add a new element 
to this particular tort, and alter its nature.”138  The court instead 
incorporated actual malice into the intentional infliction context by 
requiring that the defendant’s misconduct be intentional or 
reckless.139  In such instances, the court reasoned, the “first 
amendment will not shield intentional or reckless misconduct 
resulting in damage to reputation, and neither will it shield such 
misconduct which results in severe emotional distress.”140  Because 
Larry Flynt had intentionally published the parody and testified that 
he intended to cause Falwell emotional distress,141 the Fourth Circuit 
suggested that the jury might have found that the first element of the 
tort had been satisfied.142 
The Supreme Court, in deciding Falwell, rejected the Fourth 
                                                          
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 133. Id. at 1274. 
 134. Id. (“The defendants are, therefore, entitled to the same level of first 
amendment protection in the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
that they received in Falwell’s claim for libel.”). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. (examining Hustler’s contention that Falwell had to “prove that the 
parody was published with knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth”). 
 137. See id. at 1273–74 (noting Hustler’s contention that, as “the jury found that 
the parody was not reasonably believable,” the statements contained within the 
parody could not be statements of fact “but must be opinion and are, therefore, 
completely shielded by the first amendment”). 
 138. Id. at 1275. 
 139. See id. (observing that Virginia law on intentional infliction of emotional 
distress first “require[d] that the defendant’s misconduct be intentional or 
reckless”). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1276. 
 142. Id. 
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Circuit’s method of incorporating the actual malice standard into the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress context.143  The Court 
explained that it was insufficient for a state to assert that it was 
“protecting public figures from emotional distress” in denying “First 
Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is 
intended to inflict emotional injury, even when that speech could not 
reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the 
public figure involved.”144  In effect, the Court was preventing public 
figures from doing an end run around First Amendment 
protections.145 
There are several ways to read Falwell and apply it to Phelps.  If the 
Falwell decision emphasizes the limitations on when public figures can 
recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the 
case would seem to have little import for whether Albert Snyder 
could collect such damages,146 since he does not qualify as a public 
figure.147  If, however, the crux of Falwell is the Court’s focus on and 
distrust of the outrageousness standard and its suggestion that the 
First Amendment provides robust protection for discussions of public 
affairs, then Falwell might support protection of at least some of the 
statements of the Phelps family.148 
2. The privacy interest and tortious injury 
Because Falwell is distinguishable from Phelps in that the former 
involved a public figure,149 it does not provide clear guidance with 
respect to the proper resolution of Phelps.  Several other cases may be 
                                                          
 143. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Arlen W. Langvardt, Stopping the End-Run by Public Plaintiffs:  Falwell and 
the Refortification of Defamation Law’s Constitutional Aspects, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 665, 
668 (1989) (asserting that the Court virtually eradicated public figures’ opportunity 
to receive tort damages for defamatory statements through an emotional distress 
claim). 
 146. But see Volokh, supra note 32, at 304–05 (“[T]he underlying rationale of 
Hustler . . . applies to all speech on matters of public concern—whether the plaintiff 
is a public figure or a private figure, and whether the speech is about a public figure, 
a private figure, or no particular person at all.”). 
 147. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(“Petitioner Albert Snyder is not a public figure.”); see also Richard Weisberg, Two 
Wrongs Almost Make a “Right”:  The 4th Circuit’s Bizarre Use of the Already Bizarre 
“Milkovich” Case in Snyder v. Phelps, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 345, 347 (2010) 
(asserting that the Snyders were private figures). 
 148. But see infra notes 208–211 and accompanying text (suggesting that the 
Court’s comment about public affairs was intended to refer to contexts involving 
public figures). 
 149. Compare Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (“Here it is clear 
that respondent Falwell is a ‘public figure’ for purposes of First Amendment law”), 
with Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Petitioner 
Albert Snyder is not a public figure.”). 
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helpful to consider, including some involving the publication of 
private information.   
Consider Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,150 which involved the 
publication of the name of a seventeen-year-old victim who was raped 
and murdered.151  Georgia law made it a misdemeanor to publish the 
name or identity of a rape victim.152  A reporter, Thomas Wassell, 
learned the name of the victim from an indictment that was available 
for inspection.153  That night, he included the victim’s name in a 
television news report about the proceedings, which was aired again 
the following day.154  The victim’s father sued the station for invasion 
of privacy.155  The tort of public disclosure, recognized in Georgia, 
protected the plaintiff’s “right to be free from unwanted publicity 
about his private affairs, which, although wholly true, would be 
offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”156   
The Cohn Court recognized that “powerful arguments can and have 
been made that ‘there is a zone of privacy surrounding every 
individual, a zone within which the State may protect him from 
intrusion by the press, with all its attendant publicity.’”157  However, 
the Court also recognized that important interests were served by 
protecting the press in their accurate reporting about matters of 
public concern.158  Because there were important and competing 
interests at stake,159 the Court framed the issue narrowly—”whether 
the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the 
name of a rape victim obtained from public records—more 
specifically, from judicial records which are maintained in 
connection with a public prosecution and which themselves are open 
to public inspection.”160  The Court answered that question in the 
negative.161   
Several other cases established that the state must satisfy a very high 
burden before it can prevent the publication of truthful 
                                                          
 150. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
 151. Id. at 471. 
 152. Id. at 471–72. 
 153. Id. at 472–73. 
 154. Id. at 473–74. 
 155. Id. at 474. 
 156. Id. at 489. 
 157. Id. at 487. 
 158. Id. at 490–91. 
 159. See id. at 491 (recognizing a “sphere of collision between claims of privacy 
and those of the free press,” as both interests were “plainly rooted in the traditions 
and significant concerns of our society”). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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information.162  One case in particular bears examination here, if only 
because the publication of the information at issue both foreseeably 
and actually caused great harm. 
In The Florida Star v. B.J.F.,163 the Court addressed a Florida statute 
prohibiting the publication of the name of a victim of a sexual 
offense.164  The Florida Star published a rape victim’s name obtained 
from a police report.165  The victim testified that she had suffered 
greatly from the publication of her name—she was forced to “change 
her phone number and residence, to seek police protection, and to 
obtain mental health counseling.”166  Presumably, one reason Florida 
statutorily prohibited divulging the name of a sexual assault victim 
was to prevent certain foreseeable harms.  For example, the 
individual who committed the assault might be induced to threaten 
the victim further or, perhaps, others reading about the assault might 
make such threats, either as a prank or with the intent of 
perpetrating additional harm.167  
The B.J.F. Court explained that “the sensitivity and significance of 
the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and 
privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no 
more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.”168  In 
this case, the Court held that the First Amendment precluded the 
imposition of liability.169  In doing so, the Court reasoned that in 
instances “where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it 
has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, 
only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order, 
and that no such interest is satisfactorily served by imposing 
liability . . . under the facts of this case.”170 
                                                          
 162. See, e.g., Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977) (per 
curiam) (holding that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not permit a state 
court to prohibit the publication of widely disseminated information [the name and 
photo of a minor charged in a shooting] obtained at court proceedings which were 
in fact open to the public”); see also Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105–
06 (1979) (“At issue is simply the power of a state to punish the truthful publication 
of an alleged juvenile delinquent’s name lawfully obtained by a newspaper.  The 
asserted state interest cannot justify the statute’s imposition of criminal sanctions on 
this type of publication.”). 
 163. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
 164. See id. at 526. 
 165. Id. at 527. 
 166. Id. at 528. 
 167. E.g., id. at 542–43 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that, in the aftermath of the 
publication of her identity, “B.J.F. received harassing phone calls, required mental 
health counseling, was forced to move from her home, and was even threatened with 
being raped again”). 
 168. Id. at 533. 
 169. Id. at 541. 
 170. Id.; see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–18 (2001) (holding that the 
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The cases above are open to numerous interpretations.  For 
example, it might be thought that the First Amendment offers special 
protection to publishing and broadcast media.171  The Court has often 
discussed the importance of preventing voluntary self-censorship by 
the press172 and has further suggested that the press sometimes 
functions as the public’s “eyes and ears.”173 Were this the correct 
reading of the cases protecting the right to publish accurate 
information, it would not seem to help the Phelps family very much, 
both because the Phelps family was not acting as the press reporting 
on events and because what they said, while perhaps not false, is 
better construed as not asserting facts about the Snyders at all rather 
than as making accurate assertions about them.174  
Even if the First Amendment were thought to give the press and 
media special protection, it would be inaccurate to believe that the 
First Amendment gives the news media a carte blanche.175  A few 
important cases involving protection of the media are relevant for 
purposes of the discussion here. 
a. Zacchini, the right of publicity, and funeral protests 
At first blush, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.176 would 
seem unhelpful in determining the constitutional limitations on tort 
liability for funeral protests, as Zacchini involved a broadcast of an 
individual’s entire circus act during a news program.177  The 
                                                          
First Amendment protected the disclosure of an illegally intercepted cell phone 
conversation where those disclosing the information played no role in illegally 
intercepting it). 
 171. But cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684–85 (1972) (denying newsmen a 
“constitutional right of access to the scenes of crimes or disaster when the general 
public is excluded”); id. at 685 (affirming the ability of states to prohibit the news 
media from “attending or publishing information about trials if such restrictions are 
necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal”). 
 172. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“Our decisions 
recognize that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to 
guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-
censorship.”). 
 173. E.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978). 
 174. The Fourth Circuit, for example, construed the statements as simply not 
making factual assertions about the Snyders at all. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 
223 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that “no reasonable reader” would interpret the signs 
held by the Phelpses “as asserting actual and objectively verifiable facts about Snyder 
or his son”), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 175. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669–72 (1991) (rejecting 
an argument that the First Amendment precluded the imposition of damages against 
the defendant newspapers for publishing the identity of a confidential source); 
Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 693 (1989) (affirming a 
libel verdict against the defendant newspaper under the New York Times standard). 
 176. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 177. Id. at 563–64. 
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accompanying commentary about the circus act was favorable,178 so it 
would have been unreasonable for the individual to assert that he or 
his act were unfairly maligned.179  However, Ohio law specified that 
“one may not use for his own benefit the name or likeness of another, 
whether or not the use or benefit is a commercial one.”180  As a result, 
the broadcaster “would be liable for the appropriation over [the 
performer’s] objection and in the absence of license or privilege, of 
[the performer’s] right to the publicity value of his performance.”181  
The issue before the Court was whether “the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments immunized [the broadcaster] from damages for its 
alleged infringement of [the performer’s] state-law ‘right of 
publicity.’”182 
The case would have been very different if the television station 
“had merely reported that petitioner was performing at the fair and 
described or commented on his act, with or without showing his 
picture on television.”183  But by televising the entire act, the station 
had done much more.184 
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the station was 
“constitutionally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of 
public interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of 
publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate for some 
nonprivileged purpose.”185  The Ohio court wrongly assumed that the 
Constitution required use of the actual malice standard in any case 
involving publication on a matter of public interest.186  But, as Gertz 
makes clear, the United States Supreme Court had never envisioned 
that the actual malice standard would be used in all tort actions in 
which compensation was sought for harms allegedly resulting from a 
wrongful publication concerning the plaintiff.187 
When deciding Zacchini, the Ohio Supreme Court had been misled 
by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill,188 
which established that in false light cases involving matters of public 
                                                          
 178. Id. at 564 n.1. 
 179. See id. at 572–73 (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389, 
400 (1960)) (describing how the law of privacy is divided into four types of intrusions 
of four different interests, only some of which require injury to reputation). 
 180. Id. at 565. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 569. 
 184. See id. at 576 (describing the effect of broadcasting the whole performance as 
“similar to preventing petitioner from charging an admission fee”). 
 185. Id. at 569. 
 186. See id. at 571–72. 
 187. For a discussion of Gertz, see supra notes 88–115 and accompanying text. 
 188. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
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interest,189 the actual malice standard should be employed even if the 
plaintiff is a private individual.190  But false light cases implicate a 
reputational interest,191 whereas the interest at issue in a right of 
publicity case involves “the right of the individual to reap the reward 
of his endeavors.”192  Because the interests implicated are different, 
there is no constitutional requirement that the actual malice standard 
be used in these distinct kinds of torts. 
The Zacchini Court noted that in “‘false light’ cases the only way to 
protect the interests involved is to attempt to minimize publication of 
the damaging matter, while in ‘right of publicity’ cases the only 
question is who gets to do the publishing.”193  Basically, the Court 
implied that awarding damages in false light cases serves the function 
of chilling reputation-harming speech, whereas awarding damages in 
right of publicity cases serves the function of redistributing monies 
from the undeserving defendant to the deserving plaintiff.194  In the 
right of publicity cases, the communication of ideas is not chilled, 
although the misappropriation of others’ work is disincentivized.  
Cases centered around false light or the right of publicity are not 
directly on point in a funeral-picketing case.  Reputational interests 
were not at issue in Phelps, and the whole point in the funeral protest 
case is not to minimize publication per se but, instead, to limit where 
the protest occurs so that the funeral is not disrupted and so that 
participants in the funeral are not subjected to an attack at a time 
and in a place where the individuals are most vulnerable.195  
                                                          
 189. False light cases involve “publicity that places the plaintiff in a ‘false light’ in 
the public eye.”  Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562 at n.7 (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 
CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960)). 
 190. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 570–71 (noting that the Ohio court “relied heavily” 
on Hill and that the Hill Court held “the opening of a new play linked to an actual 
incident was a matter of public interest and that Hill could not recover without 
showing that the Life report was knowingly false or was published with reckless 
disregard for the truth”); see also Hill, 385 U.S. at 387–88 (explaining that First 
Amendment protections prohibited application of a state statute allowing for 
“redress [of] false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that 
the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless 
disregard of the truth”). 
 191. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (quoting William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. 
REV. 383, 400 (1960)) (“‘The interest protected’ in permitting recovery for placing 
the plaintiff in a false light ‘is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of 
mental distress as in defamation.’”).  Even if one limits the focus to cases involving a 
reputational interest, Gertz makes clear that it is inaccurate to believe that the actual 
malice standard must be met whenever matters of public concern are at issue.  
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id.  
 195. But cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213, 1218 (2011) (noting that the 
church told authorities of its intent to picket, remained on public land, and did not 
yell or use violence). 
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Arguably, Zacchini and funeral protest cases are both about control 
of the conditions under which certain contents are communicated; 
however, there are important aspects in which the analogy between 
the two cases breaks down.  For example, the Zacchini Court 
suggested that an “entertainer . . .  usually has no objection to the 
widespread publication of his act as long as he gets the commercial 
benefit of such publication.”196  However, Snyder was not seeking the 
commercial rewards of the funeral protest.  Instead, he would have 
preferred that the funeral protest had never taken place.  
The Zacchini Court’s analysis of the harm to the plaintiff is 
interesting to note.  The Court reasoned that the “effect of a public 
broadcast of the performance is similar to preventing petitioner from 
charging an admission fee,”197 positing that “if the public can see the 
act free on television, it will be less willing to pay to see it at the 
fair.”198  Of course, seeing such an act on television might not be as 
enjoyable as seeing it in person, and the favorable publicity from the 
news broadcast might have increased circus attendance.  Be that as it 
may, the Zacchini Court accepted the legitimacy of the goal of 
“preventing unjust enrichment,”199 and the Court implied that the 
television station was unjustly enriched by broadcasting the entire 
act.200  Arguably, individuals who protest at funerals to get free 
publicity might be viewed as being unjustly enriched,201 and Zacchini 
provides not only a possible rationale for imposing liability under 
such circumstances but also a method of computing damages—one 
might have experts testify in light of industry standards about how 
much the free publicity would have cost had it been purchased.202  
Indeed, Justice Alito noted that on other occasions the Phelps family 
had agreed not to protest in exchange for free air time,203 which 
                                                          
 196. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. 
 197. Id. at 576. 
 198. Id. at 575. 
 199. See id. at 576 (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr.,  Privacy in Tort Law:  Were Warren and 
Brandeis Wrong? 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 331 (1966)) (“No social purpose is 
served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have 
market value and for which he would normally pay.”)). 
 200. See id. at 575–76. 
 201. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011) (stating that there was 
“no doubt that Westboro chose to stage its picketing at . . . Matthew Snyder’s funeral 
to increase publicity for its views”). 
 202. Cf. Lisa Greene, Helmets of sand still grind on skeptics, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES 1, 
Mar. 27, 2001, at 4B (discussing how much certain free publicity would have cost if 
purchased). 
 203. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1224 (Alito, J., dissenting) (explaining that the church 
agreed not to picket the funeral of a young girl killed in a Tucson shooting in 
exchange for “free air time on the radio”); id. at 1225 (observing that in 2006, “the 
church got air time on a talk radio show in exchange for canceling its threatened 
protest at the funeral of five Amish girls killed by a crazed gunman”). 
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suggests that the Church is gaining a benefit (exposure that would 
presumably be very costly to purchase) at the expense of others when 
they are most vulnerable. 
States differ about what must be shown in order for an unjust 
enrichment claim to be brought successfully.  For example, suppose 
that under state law a plaintiff cannot prevail on an unjust 
enrichment claim unless she can show that the defendant received a 
benefit for which the plaintiff expected to receive compensation or 
would have expected to receive compensation had the plaintiff 
known the facts.204  In such a state, an unjust enrichment action 
brought by a funeral protest victim would likely be unsuccessful 
because the plaintiff would not have expected to be paid for the free 
publicity accorded to the funeral protesters.  
Yet some state courts have described the elements of unjust 
enrichment rather broadly.  The Iowa Supreme Court offered the 
basic elements of an unjust enrichment case as requiring that:  “(1) 
[the] defendant was enriched by the receipt of a benefit; (2) the 
enrichment was at the expense of the plaintiff; and (3) it is unjust to 
allow the defendant to retain the benefit under the circumstances.”205  
The Colorado Supreme Court similarly described unjust enrichment 
as requiring a showing that “(1) at plaintiff’s expense (2) defendant 
received a benefit (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust 
for defendant to retain the benefit without paying.”206  A family 
victimized by a funeral protest could perhaps successfully bring an 
unjust enrichment claim in light of these elements, but only if the 
enrichment enjoyed by the defendant (free publicity) was 
understood to be at the family’s “expense” in the relevant legal 
sense.207  
In his own Supreme Court case, Jerry Falwell argued that Zacchini 
supported his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 
because “the State [sought] to prevent not reputational damage, but 
the severe emotional distress suffered by the person who is the 
subject of an offensive publication.”208 The Court rejected Falwell’s 
                                                          
 204. See, e.g., Fasching v. Kallinger, 510 A.2d 694, 699–700 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1986) (holding that survivors of a murder victim were precluded from 
recovering damages from murderer’s biographer because survivors conferred no 
benefit on murderer and expected no remuneration). 
 205. Dep’t of Human Servs. ex rel. Palmer v. Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 154–
55 (Iowa 2001). 
 206. Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998, 1007 (Colo. 2008) (en 
banc) (citing DCB Constr. Co., Inc. v. Cent. City Dev. Co., 965 P.2d 115, 119–20 
(Colo. 1998). 
 207. See id. (requiring that the unjust enrichment be at the plaintiff’s expense).   
 208. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (citing Zacchini v. 
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argument primarily because “in the world of debate about public 
affairs, many things done with motives that are less than admirable 
are protected by the First Amendment.”209  However, in discussing 
debates about public affairs, the Falwell Court made clear that it 
specifically had discussions about public officials in mind, citing 
Garrison in support.210  This explains the Falwell Court’s conclusion 
that “while such a bad motive may be deemed controlling for 
purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, . . . the First 
Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about 
public figures.”211  
Basically, Falwell was not helped by the Zacchini rejection of the 
actual malice standard in a non-defamation tort context, because 
Falwell was a public figure.  But Zacchini’s categorization and 
distinguishing of torts might be very important in an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress action involving a private individual, 
especially given Gertz’s recognition that the state has different 
interests implicated when protecting private individuals rather than 
public figures.212 
b. Pacifica Foundation, offensive speech, and the duty to avert one’s 
 attention 
A much different case involving the media that would seem to have 
relevance here is FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.213  That case involved a 
complaint about the broadcast of George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” 
monologue on the radio during the middle of the afternoon.214  The 
Court held that the “indecent” speech at issue,215 although afforded 
constitutional protection,216 nonetheless could be restricted so that it 
would only be broadcast at a time when children would be less likely 
                                                          
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)).   
 209. Id. at 53. 
 210. See id. (discussing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)).  For a 
discussion of Garrison, see supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text.  
 211. Falwell, 458 U.S. at 53  (emphasis added). 
 212. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341–45 (differentiating the 
state’s interests in protecting the reputations of private and public individuals by the 
latter group’s voluntary exposure and greater opportunity for rebuttal, and by the 
need to balance the interest in protecting public figures against the interest in an 
“vital and uninhibited” press). 
 213. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 214. Id. at 729. 
 215. See id. at 741 (noting that there was “no basis for disagreeing with the . . . 
conclusion that indecent language was used in this broadcast”). 
 216. Id. at 744 (declaring that Carlin’s monologue was “unquestionably ‘speech’ 
within the meaning of the First Amendment”). 
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to listen.217  The Court employed a “nuisance rationale,”218 explaining 
that “[w]ords that are commonplace in one setting are shocking in 
another . . . one occasion’s lyric is another’s vulgarity.”219 
The Pacifica Foundation Court understood that its holding might 
seem to contradict its decision220 in Cohen v. California.221  At issue in 
Cohen was the conviction of an individual who had been in a 
courthouse wearing a jacket with the words “Fuck the Draft” written 
on it.222  The Cohen Court suggested that those objecting to the 
message could simply avert their eyes.223  Analogously, a parent who 
did not want her child to hear Carlin’s monologue might either 
change the station or turn off the radio.224  The Pacifica Foundation 
Court rejected the proposition that the ease with which one might 
turn off the radio either negated the harm or provided an adequate 
remedy.225   
Pacifica Foundation suggests that some kinds of expression, while 
protected, may nonetheless be channeled in a manner where the 
communication can still take place at certain times and in certain 
places but will not have the undesirable effects that might occur 
absent the channeling.226  Thus, for example, the Court upheld in 
                                                          
 217. See id. at 750 (observing the Commission’s placement of emphasis on the 
time of day); id. at 749 (concluding that “Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a 
child’s vocabulary in an instant”); see also id. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The 
Commission’s primary concern was to prevent the broadcast from reaching the ears of 
unsupervised children who were likely to be in the audience at that hour.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 218. Id. at 750. 
 219. Id. at 747. 
 220. See id. at 747 n.25 (describing contextual factors supporting the Court’s 
holding that Cohen’s speech was protected despite the fact that it might offend 
unwilling viewers); id. at 749 n.27 (explaining that the burden is sometimes on the 
offended listener to turn away from offensive speech). 
 221. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 222. Id. at 16. 
 223. See id. at 21 (noting that those offended in the courthouse “could effectively 
avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes”); see 
also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975) (citing Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21) (observing that the Constitution generally places the 
burden on the unwilling viewer of offensive material “to ‘avoid further bombardment 
of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes’”). 
 224. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 765–66 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing 
“the minimal discomfort suffered by a listener who inadvertently tunes into a 
program he finds offensive during the brief interval before he can simply extend his 
arm and switch stations or flick the ‘off’ button”). 
 225. See id. at 748–49 (explaining that the suggestion of “avoid[ing] further 
offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying the 
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow”); see also Njeri Mathis 
Rutledge, A Time to Mourn:  Balancing the Right of Free Speech Against the Right of Privacy 
in Funeral Picketing, 67 MD. L. REV. 295, 330 (2008) (declaring that Cohen is 
distinguishable from funeral picketing in the ability to avert one’s attention). 
 226. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 750 (explaining that the context of the speech 
is “all important”). 
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Grayned v. City of Rockford227  an ordinance that prohibited disruptive 
demonstrations during public school hours.228  Under the ordinance, 
individuals were permitted to engage in protests; their speech was not 
chilled.229  However, they were not permitted to hold such protests 
during school hours because doing so might disrupt the classes in 
session.230  At least one question raised by Phelps involves the 
permissible steps that might be taken to prevent funeral picketing,231 
so as not to disturb the peace and tranquility of the mourners while 
also allowing ample alternatives so that the desired messages could 
still be communicated.232  
C. Reconciling the Different Cases with Phelps 
Prior to Phelps, the existing case law did not clearly dictate a 
particular result in a funeral-picketing case where defamation was not 
at issue.  Where there has been no injury to reputation, defamation 
cases are not clearly on point, although the jurisprudence might 
nonetheless suggest  how such a case should be decided.  Although 
Falwell also involved an intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim, it, too, is not clearly on point because it was brought by a 
public figure and the holding seemed designed to preclude an end 
run around First Amendment protections.233  Precisely because 
Snyder was a private individual rather than a public figure and 
because damages would be imposed because of the outrageousness of 
where the protest took place rather than solely what was said, Falwell 
would seem distinguishable. 
Some cases have spoken to the great importance of protecting free 
expression.  For example, the Cohen Court cautioned that one 
“cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a 
trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a 
privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly implicated.”234  
                                                          
 227. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
 228. See id. at 121 (1972) (holding that the antinoise ordinance was not invalid on 
its face). 
 229. See id. at 119–21 (holding that the antinoise ordinance was not overbroad). 
 230. Id. at 107–08.  
 231. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011) (noting that “Westboro’s 
choice of where and when to conduct its picketing [was] not beyond the 
Government’s regulatory reach”).  
 232. See Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 366 (6th Cir. 2008) (recognizing 
the state’s ability to protect those who are engaged in “collective, shared grief . . . [in 
paying] their final respects to the deceased and to offer comfort to one another”). 
 233. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (holding that speech 
does lose its First Amendment protection when it is motivated by an intent to cause 
severe emotional distress ). 
 234. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
STRASSER.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2012  8:08 PM 
310 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:279 
Since it is “often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric”235 and 
because one cannot “forbid particular words without also running a 
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process . . . [and 
providing] a convenient guise for banning the expression of 
unpopular views,”236 the Court must keep a watchful eye on those who 
would countenance the imposition of burdens on expression.  Yet, 
the Pacifica Foundation Court seemed to view Cohen with a jaundiced 
eye,237 and funeral picketing might be understood as a variant of 
Pacifica Foundation in which speech should be prohibited in one place 
at a particular time, justified by a nuisance theory.  Basically, the 
claim would be that funeral picketing should be precluded regardless 
of the content of the speech.  Indeed, many of the statutes aimed at 
prohibiting funeral picketing are written in content-neutral terms238 
that restrict all speech at a particular place during particular times.239 
1. Compliance with the law:  a vaccine against tortious liability?  
The Phelps Court emphasized that the “church members had the 
right to be where they were.  Westboro alerted local authorities to its 
funeral protest and fully complied with police guidance on where the 
picketing could be staged.”240  Further, much of what the Church said 
involved “matters of public import,”241 notwithstanding that some of 
their comments might have been thought to have involved matters of 
purely private concern.242 
Regrettably, the Court was too reticent when explaining why it 
                                                          
 235. Id.  
 236. Id. at 26. 
 237. See supra notes 220–25 and accompanying text (discussing the Pacifica 
Foundation Court’s rejection of the avert-your-eyes remedy suggested by Cohen). 
 238. See, e.g., McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 985 (E.D. Ky. 2006) 
(examining a Kentucky funeral picketing statute and declaring it to be content 
neutral, “motivated by the need to prevent all interferences with all funerals 
regardless of the content or creator of the interference . . . [and] to the extent that 
the provisions are justified by the need to prevent citizens from being subjected to all 
unwanted communications, regardless of the content or communicator”). 
 239. See Christina E. Wells, Privacy and Funeral Protests, 87 N.C. L. REV. 151, 
173 (2008) (suggesting that funeral picketing statutes will likely be treated as “facially 
content-neutral because, by their terms, they do not regulate content”); see also 
Stephen R. McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 575, 
580 (2007) (noting that most state picketing restrictions are specific in that they 
create buffer zones for a specific time period around a specific location). 
 240. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011). 
 241. Id. at 1217. 
 242. Id. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting) (contending that the attack on the Snyders 
“was not speech on a matter of public concern”).  But see id. at 1217 (majority 
opinion) (asserting that the placards in question highlighted “issues of public 
import,” such as “the political and moral conduct of the United States and its 
citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving 
the Catholic clergy”).  
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mattered that the Phelps family followed police directions.  It is 
almost as if the Court was estopping the state from punishing 
members of the Phelps family because they complied with the 
instructions of the police.243  Yet, at issue was not the violation of a 
criminal statute but, instead, the potential liability of the defendants 
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.  By telling the 
Phelps family where they should stage their demonstration, the police 
were not implicitly promising immunity from a civil suit.  If the 
defendants had made defamatory statements from that location, they 
would not have been immunized by following police directions.244  
The defendants also would not have been immunized if the protest 
had been so loud that those participating in the funeral could not 
help but hear the protests.245   
The Phelps Court understood that “Westboro’s choice to convey its 
views in conjunction with Matthew Snyder’s funeral made the 
expression of those views particularly hurtful to many, especially 
Matthew’s father.”246  Indeed, the Court had recently recognized that 
family members “have a personal stake in honoring and mourning 
their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by 
intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and 
respect they seek to accord to the deceased person who was once 
their own.”247  Yet, the Court seemed to belie its appreciation of the 
harm done to Matthew Snyder’s father with respect to the comments 
that might have been interpreted as being directed specifically at the 
Snyder family.  
                                                          
 243. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 570–71 (1965) (explaining that it was 
improper to convict a demonstration leader for violating a statute punishing 
picketing near a courthouse when police had granted the demonstrators permission 
to meet across the street from a courthouse and the demonstration was confined to 
that area); cf. Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 618–19 (Mass. 1993) 
(affording the defendants an affirmative defense against a manslaughter charge 
because the Attorney General had issued a potentially misleading opinion regarding 
the legal obligations of Christian Science parents with respect to the refusal of 
medical treatment for their children). 
 244. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1214 (noting that the necessary elements of 
defamation could not be established).  Had those elements been established, the 
defamatory comments would not have been protected merely because they had not 
been made too close to the funeral.  
 245. See id. at 1220 (noting that the speech “did not itself disrupt the funeral”); cf. 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (declaring that it is a “permissible exercise 
of legislative discretion to bar sound trucks with broadcasts of public interests, 
amplified to a loud and raucous volume, from the public ways of municipalities”); see 
also Zachary P. Augustine, Comment, Speech Shouldn’t Be “Free” at Funerals:  An Analysis 
of the Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 375, 397 (2008) 
(denoting the use of sound amplification devices at funeral protests). 
 246. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1217. 
 247. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004). 
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While many of the comments on the defendants’ signs involved 
matters of public concern,248 some did not.  The Court seemed to 
recognize this when noting that “even if a few of the signs—such as 
‘You’re Going to Hell’ and ‘God Hates You’—were viewed as 
containing messages related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders 
specifically, that would not change the fact that the overall thrust and 
dominant theme of Westboro’s demonstration spoke to broader 
public issues.”249  However, as Justice Alito points out in his dissent, it 
was utterly unclear why comments discussing matters of purely private 
concern were not considered actionable.250   
One can contrast the Phelps Court’s discussion of the signs “You’re 
Going to Hell” and “God Hates You” with the analysis offered by the 
Fourth Circuit of those same signs.  The Fourth Circuit concluded 
that “these two signs cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating 
actual facts about any individual.”251  
Certainly, courts will sometimes construe statements in a particular 
way as a matter of law, jury construction to the contrary 
notwithstanding.  For example, consider the comments made about a 
particular individual, Charles Bresler, at a public meeting.252  Bresler 
sought a zoning variance from the local city council.253  He also 
owned land that the city wished to purchase for a new high school.254  
Bresler was apparently driving a hard bargain and was accused during 
the meeting of engaging in blackmail.255  That accusation was later 
published in a local newspaper.256  The question before the Court was 
whether the charge against Bresler could reasonably be construed as 
a claim that he committed a felony.257  The Court held that the charge 
could not reasonably have been so construed,258 notwithstanding that 
                                                          
 248. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1216–17  (listing some of the signs including:  “God 
Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “America is Doomed,” “Don’t Pray for the 
USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell”). 
 249. Id. at 1217. 
 250. Id. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I fail to see why actionable speech should 
be immunized simply because it is interspersed with speech that is protected.  The 
First Amendment allows recovery for defamatory statements that are interspersed 
with nondefamatory statements on matters of public concern, and there is no good 
reason why respondents’ attack on Matthew Snyder and his family should be treated 
differently.”). 
 251. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 224 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 
(2011). 
 252. Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 7 (1970). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 13. 
 258. Id. at 14 (expressing disbelief that a reader would not have understood the 
term “blackmail” in the contested articles to mean that “it was Bresler’s public and 
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the term “blackmail” can refer to a criminal act depending upon the 
context. 
Yet, the Bresler Court was on firmer ground when it construed the 
blackmail charge as not involving a claim about the commission of a 
felony than was the Fourth Circuit in Phelps when it denied that any 
matters of purely private concern had been addressed.  As Justice 
Alito suggested in his dissent, some of the signs at the funeral and 
some of the comments on the website seemed to be directed at the 
Snyders in particular and might quite reasonably have been 
construed as not involving any matters of public concern.259  Those 
comments might instead have been interpreted to be brutal attacks 
upon Matthew Snyder that were “almost certain to inflict injury.”260  
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit at one point admitted in passing that “[a] 
reasonable reader could interpret these signs . . . as referring to 
Snyder or his son only . . . .”261  
The United States Supreme Court should be commended for 
admitting that some of the material might have been construed not 
to involve a matter of public concern,262 but the Court should have 
taken up Justice Alito’s challenge263 and addressed the possible tort 
ramifications of the Phelps family saying to the deceased’s family that 
the deceased was going to hell.  The Court could have argued that 
the jury was and would be presented with an impossible task.  Not 
only would they have been asked to determine whether the 
defendants’ actions, rather than Matthew Snyder’s death, had caused 
                                                          
wholly legal negotiating proposals that were being criticized”); see also Old Dominion 
Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 285 
(1974) (noting that it was “impossible to believe” that a reader of the newsletter in 
question was accusing “the appellees with committing the criminal offense of 
treason”). 
 259. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1225—26 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting); see 
also Jason M. Dorsky, Note, A New Battleground for Free Speech:  The Impact of Snyder v. 
Phelps, 7 PIERCE L. REV. 235, 240—41 (2009) (suggesting that it was a “particularly 
egregious miscalculation” for the Church “to include signs and chants aimed directly 
at the family of Matthew Snyder”). 
 260. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1223–24 (Alito, J., dissenting); cf. Jeffrey Shulman, Free 
Speech at What Cost?:  Snyder v. Phelps and Speech-Based Tort Liability, 2010 CARDOZO L. 
REV. DE NOVO 313, 336 (2010) (claiming that the state has no interest in protecting 
statements designed for wounding private individuals). 
 261. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 224 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 
(2011). 
 262. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1217 (2011).  It is not always easy to tell whether 
something is a matter of public concern; cf. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 553 
(1989) (White, J., dissenting) (“There is no public interest in publishing the names, 
addresses, and phone numbers of persons who are the victims of crime . . . .”). 
 263. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1228 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I would therefore hold that, 
in this setting, the First Amendment permits a private figure to recover for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by speech on a matter of private 
concern.”). 
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Albert Snyder’s severe harm, but they would also have been asked to 
determine which statements—protected versus unprotected—had 
caused that harm.  That kind of delimitation might have been 
thought an impossible task. 
Suppose the jury could somehow decide how much of the harm 
was caused by unprotected expression that targeted the family rather 
than protected expression that focused on matters of public concern.  
The facts of Phelps raise another difficulty:  some of the expressions 
on the signs were also included in the epic on the Church’s website.264  
Even if it was permissible to make certain kinds of speech at the 
funeral site subject to tort liability, such a cause of action could fail to 
reach the expressions included on the website.  If, indeed, the Court 
were to hold that the statements made on the website were 
protected,265 then the jury’s job would be that much harder because 
particular contents on the website would be protected even though 
those very same statements would not be protected if they were made 
on the day of the funeral.  The jury would then have the very difficult, 
if not impossible, task of determining which of the distasteful, 
personally-directed statements caused the father’s continuing 
anguish—the protected, distasteful comments on the website or the 
unprotected statements at the funeral.  
There is precedent for the Court’s striking down a damages award 
because of the insuperably difficult question of damages presented.  
For example, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.266  the Court 
considered “the effect of [its decision] that much of petitioners’ 
conduct was constitutionally protected on the ability of the State to 
impose liability for elements of the boycott that were not so 
protected.”267  The Claiborne Hardware Court explained that “the 
presence of activity protected by the First Amendment imposes 
restraints on the grounds that may give rise to damages liability and 
on the persons who may be held accountable for those damages.”268  
The Court cautioned that only those damages caused by conduct 
outside First Amendment protection could be awarded,269 and 
                                                          
 264. The Phelps Court did not discuss the additional difficulties created by the 
website because Snyder did not address it in his petition for certiorari. See id. at 1214 
n.1 (“The epic is not properly before us and does not factor in our analysis.”). 
 265. But see id. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“It does not follow, however, that 
they may intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on private persons at a time of 
intense emotional sensitivity by launching vicious verbal attacks that make no 
contribution to public debate.”). 
 266. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 267. Id. at 916. 
 268. Id. at 916–17. 
 269. See id. at 918 (“Only those losses proximately caused by unlawful conduct may 
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explained that any consideration of liability “on the basis of a public 
address—which predominantly contained highly charged political 
rhetoric lying at the core of the First Amendment— . . . [should be 
approached with] extreme care.”270  Basically, because it could not be 
shown that an unprotected part of Charles Evers’ “[s]trong and 
effective extemporaneous rhetoric”271 proximately caused the illegal 
acts at issue,272 the Court rejected the imposition of liability against 
him.273  Perhaps the Phelps Court was similarly concerned about 
limiting the ways that public rhetoric was used.  
The Phelps Court did address some of the ramifications of its 
opinion.  For example, the Court explained that the decision did not 
address “speech on public matters [that] was in any way contrived to 
insulate speech on a private matter from liability.”274  Consider what 
the Court might have had in mind.  Suppose that an individual was 
speaking to a group that happened to include a divorced parent of a 
child who had recently committed suicide.  Knowing of the parent’s 
vulnerable state, the individual started talking about how society 
should make divorce more difficult to obtain, because of the untold 
harms that no–fault divorce imposes on children, sometimes even 
causing them to commit suicide.  Further assume that the reason this 
discussion was put forward was not to discuss a matter of public 
concern, but to inflict great harm on the mourning parent by causing 
the parent to blame herself for her child’s suicide.  The Phelps Court 
implies that an intentional infliction of emotional distress award 
based on such a scenario might pass constitutional muster, assuming 
all the elements of the tort were met in light of local law.  
2. A balance of interests:  Snyder’s right to privacy and the Church’s right to 
protest 
Ample evidence suggests that the Phelps family was not targeting 
the Snyders in particular275 as opposed to other families of soldiers 
who had died in war or other individuals whose funerals could be 
picketed to gain public exposure.276  The Court was clear about why 
                                                          
be recovered.”). 
 270. Id. at 926–27. 
 271. Id. at 928. 
 272. See id. 
 273. See id. at 929 (noting the constitutional inadequacy of the findings supporting 
a damage award). 
 274. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011). 
 275. See, e.g., id. (highlighting the lack of a pre-existing conflict between the 
church and Snyder that could suggest that Westboro was merely intending to mask a 
private attack against Snyder). 
 276. See id. at 1224 (Alito, J., dissenting) (elaborating upon the Church’s strategy 
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the funerals were being picketed—as a method by which Phelps and 
the Church would get increased publicity.277  Snyder argued that it 
was important to consider the context in which the picketing 
occurred—his son’s funeral.278  The Court rejected that the context 
changed the character of the speech from a matter of public concern 
to one of private concern.279   
A different way to understand the point about context is to 
consider the Pacifica Foundation analogy to nuisance law—even 
speech protected by the First Amendment may be restricted in where 
or when it is delivered.280  Traditional time, place, and manner 
restrictions impose some limitations on where speech can be 
delivered.  Such restrictions are valid, provided that “they are justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they 
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and 
that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication 
of the information.”281  Indeed, the Court was careful to note that it 
was not discussing the constitutionality of the various state statutes 
imposing content-neutral restrictions on funeral picketing.282 
Consider a state law that prohibits demonstrations near funerals.  
The Phelps family might challenge the constitutionality of such a law, 
arguing that the Church would not have adequate alternative 
channels of communication, since the Church would not get the 
same media attention if prevented from spreading its message at 
funerals.283  However, as the Court has pointed out elsewhere, “the 
                                                          
of protesting military funerals, the funerals of public safety officers, and the victims 
of “natural disasters, accidents, and shocking crimes”). 
 277. Id. at 1217 (“There is no doubt that Westboro chose to stage its picketing at 
the Naval Academy, the Maryland State House, and Matthew Snyder’s funeral to 
increase publicity for its views.”); see also Dorsky, supra note 259, at 243 (positing that 
the Church did not select its venues because of religious purposes, “but rather by the 
desire to be noticed”).  The Eighth Circuit characterized the purpose of the 
Church’s picketing somewhat differently.  See Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480, 
483 (8th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging the appellant’s claim that “funerals are the only 
place where her religious message can be delivered in a timely and relevant 
manner”). 
 278. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1217.  
 279. Id. (noting that the context of Lance Corporal Snyder’s funeral did not “by 
itself transform the nature of Westboro’s speech”). 
 280. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731–32, 750 (1978). 
 281. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (citing 
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)). 
 282. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1218 (“Maryland now has a law imposing restrictions on 
funeral picketing . . . .  To the extent [this law is] content neutral, [it] raise[s] very 
different questions from the tort verdict at issue in this case . . . .  [W]e have no 
occasion to consider whether it or other similar regulations are constitutional.”); see 
also Rutledge, supra note 225, at 318 (arguing that the picketing statutes would 
“probably be considered content neutral”). 
 283. See Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480, 488 (8th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging 
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First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s 
views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.”284  
For example, in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 
Inc.,285 the Court upheld a restriction that prevented Krishnas from 
walking around a state fair asking for donations,286 notwithstanding 
testimony that the group’s mission would be severely impaired were it 
so constricted287 and that the implicated speech was unquestionably 
protected by the First Amendment.288  But if preventing the Krishnas 
from utilizing the most effective form of communication did not 
violate constitutional guarantees, then preventing the Phelps family 
from utilizing the most effective method might also pass 
constitutional muster.289  It seems likely that a content-neutral funeral-
picketing law would be upheld as a valid time, place, manner 
restriction.290 
3. Phelps’s captive audience problem 
Snyder, who was awarded damages for intrusion upon seclusion,291 
argued that he was “a member of a captive audience at his son’s 
funeral.”292  However, the Court rejected the use of the captive 
                                                          
that Phelps-Roper had a “fair chance” of proving, for preliminary injunction 
purposes, that there were insufficient alternative channels of communication to 
funeral picketing, as the picketers “wish to reach an audience which can only be 
addressed at such occasion and to convey to and through such an audience a 
particular message”).  But see Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 372 (6th Cir. 
2008) (rejecting Phelps-Roper’s contention that there were no alternative channels 
of communication, as she could picket at other times and had other means of 
communicating her message via the church’s website). 
 284. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 
647 (1981) (citing Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966)). 
 285. 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
 286. See id. at 654 (accepting “the State’s interest in confining distribution, selling, 
and fund solicitation activities to fixed locations” as a significant governmental 
interest that can be pursued through a reasonable time, place, and manner 
restriction); id. at 655 (noting that the Krishnas could arrange for their own booth 
and sell their literature from within rather than on the fairgrounds itself). 
 287. Id. at 653 (“ISKCON desires to proselytize at the fair because it believes it can 
successfully communicate and raise funds.  In its view, this can be done only by 
intercepting fair patrons as they move about, and if success is achieved, stopping 
them momentarily or for longer periods as money is given or exchanged for 
literature.”). 
 288. Id. at 647 (acknowledging the state’s concession that the Krishnas’ activities 
fell within the protection of the First Amendment). 
 289. See Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 372 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing 
Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647) (noting that Phelps-Roper was “not entitled to her best 
means of communication”).  ,  
 290. See Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (per 
curiam) (upholding an ordinance that “prohibit[ed] all demonstration activity 
within a specified distance of health care facilities and places of worship without 
regard to the message conveyed”). 
 291. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 292. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219–20 (2011). 
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audience doctrine,293 because “Snyder could see no more than the 
tops of the signs when driving to the funeral . . . [and] there [was] no 
indication that the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral 
service itself.”294  The Court explained that the captive audience 
doctrine is applied “only sparingly to protect unwilling listeners from 
protected speech,”295 such as when it is forced upon a listener in his 
own home.  In Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,296 the 
Court noted that individuals in their own homes are free to refuse to 
receive unwanted information,297 but explained that merely because 
individuals are sometimes a captive audience within the home does 
not mean individuals necessarily share in that protection outside the 
home.298  For example, individuals do not have a constitutional right 
to be free from an unwanted radio broadcast on a public streetcar,299 
although Justice Douglas suggested in his dissent in Public Utilities 
Commission v. Pollak that individuals who take streetcars are a “captive 
audience” and should not be forced to be subjected to unwanted 
messages.300  He offered a similar analysis in a concurrence over 
twenty years later when discussing some of the protections that 
should be accorded to commuters using public transportation.301  
It is unclear whether the Court would have been willing to apply 
the captive audience doctrine had the funeral been interrupted or, 
perhaps, had the signs been noticeably and disruptively visible.302  
Ironically, when upholding the Ohio funeral-picketing law, the Sixth 
                                                          
 293. Id. at 1220 (declining to apply the captive audience doctrine because the 
doctrine is used “only sparingly”). 
 294. Id.; see also Wells, supra note 239, at 155 (“Peaceful protests do not invade 
funerals in the sense that this term is traditionally understood.  They are neither 
noisy nor disruptive.  They do not necessarily impede funeral services.  Nor do they 
involve harassment causing attendees to avoid the service.  In other words, peaceful 
protests do not invade funeral-goers’ seclusion.”).  
 295. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.  
 296. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
 297. Id. at 738 (rejecting the proposition that “a vendor has a right under the 
Constitution . . . to send unwanted material into the home of another”). 
 298. Id. at 738. 
 299. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 454 (1952). 
 300. Id. at 468 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 301. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (4–1–4 
decision) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“In my view the right of the commuters to be 
free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from transforming its 
vehicles of public transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this 
captive audience.”). 
 302. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (explaining that “Snyder 
could see no more than the tops of the signs when driving to the funeral [and that] 
there [was] no indication that the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral 
service itself”); cf. Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc) 
(dismissing the defendants’ claim that they had “a right to enter the cathedral and 
disrupt the church services of the plaintiffs” as this was “an intolerable violation of 
the rights of those engaged in worship”). 
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Circuit included within its justification the fact that the picketers had 
not been prevented from communicating with the mourners by 
making use of very large signs.303 
Suppose, then, that Snyder saw the content of some very large signs 
along the way to the funeral.  In such a scenario, the funeral still 
would not have been disrupted; it is unlikely that there would have 
been a delay or that the service would have been in competition with 
loud protesters.  However, the funeral might very well have been 
disrupted for Albert Snyder, who might have become so disturbed by 
the signs that his grieving process would have been completely 
undermined.  
In the envisioned scenario, Snyder might have been disturbed that 
there were signs at his son’s funeral at all and by the contents of the 
signs in particular.  The Phelps Court implicitly rejected that Snyder 
found the very fact of a demonstration disturbing—the Court 
hypothesized that “[a] group of parishioners standing at the very spot 
where Westboro stood, holding signs that said ‘God Bless America’ 
and ‘God Loves You,’ would not have been subjected to liability,”304 
implying that liability would only have been imposed because of 
disagreement with the message.  Yet, suppose instead that there were 
signs advocating the consumption of a particular cereal for breakfast 
or supporting a particular candidate.  Such signs might be disturbing, 
even if Snyder liked that cereal or supported that candidate, precisely 
because those holding the signs were attempting to take advantage of 
the funeral to get free publicity.305  
Certainly, one might point out that advertising a commercial 
product or promoting someone’s candidacy at a funeral might be 
unwise, because one might thereby promote consumer or elector ill 
will rather than good will.306  But the same point might have been 
                                                          
 303. Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 370 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 
Funeral Protest Provision does not place ‘limitations on the number, size, text, or 
images’ of placards, and places ‘no limitation on the number of speakers or the noise 
level, including the use of amplification equipment.’  Thus, it is conceivable that 
picketers outside of the 300-foot buffer zone can still communicate their message to 
funeral attendees.”). 
 304. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1219. 
 305. Zipursky suggests that liability might have been imposed had a publicity 
seeking group held signs saying:  “Love and Hot Sex, Not War!”.  See Zipursky, supra 
note 127, at 518.  But these signs might also be viewed as political, and one might 
infer from Phelps that the First Amendment would have precluded liability in that 
case too.  The point here is that even those agreeing with a message, whether 
political or commercial, might nonetheless believe the messages to be inappropriate 
at a funeral. 
 306. Cf. Julie Anderson & David Fish, Note, Sotelo v. Directrevenue, LLC:  Paving 
the Way for a Spyware-Free Internet, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 841, 
841 (2006) (discussing a “form of advertising [that] has gained popularity with 
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made about the wisdom of the Westboro Church funeral-picketing 
policies and that has not dissuaded them from engaging in that 
behavior. 
It is worth considering how a Phelps-like case would be decided if 
protesters picketed a funeral in violation of local law.  One of the 
ironic aspects of the Phelps opinion is that it leaves open whether 
there would be tort liability in the hypothesized case and even 
whether a content-neutral law would be more likely to pass muster if 
it restricted speech at funerals in particular or, instead, was more 
generally applicable. 
While some courts and commentators have suggested that funerals 
should be treated differently for purposes of the captive audience 
doctrine,307 the Phelps Court did not focus on aspects that were unique 
to funerals.  For example, the Court noted that the protest was 
orderly and staged where the police had instructed308 and that no 
evidence was presented to establish that the protest had interrupted 
the service.309  But if these are the relevant factors, then protesters 
who interfere with a religious service in violation of law might also be 
punished, even if that service does not involve a funeral.310  
The Pacifica Foundation nuisance rationale was offered in the 
                                                          
advertisers, but [that] has generated much ill-will with consumers”). 
 307. See Strickland, 539 F.3d at 364–65 (comparing the right of privacy in 
mourning to the right of privacy of “individuals in their homes or individuals 
entering a medical facility”)); McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 992 (E.D. 
Ky. 2006) (“[Funeral] attendees have an interest in avoiding unwanted, obtrusive 
communications which is at least similar to a person’s interest in avoiding such 
communications inside his home.  Further, like medical patients entering a medical 
facility, funeral attendees are captive.”); see also Brownstein & Amar, supra note 35, at 
373 (“While the issue is certainly not free from doubt and argument, we believe, as 
we elaborate below, that funerals present a similarly or more compelling case of 
audience captivity and vulnerability as the circumstances discussed in [other cases 
where the captive audience doctrine was applied].”); Jeffrey Shulman, The Outrageous 
God:  Emotional Distress, Tort Liability, and the Limits of Religious Advocacy, 113 PENN ST. 
L. REV. 381, 406 (2008) (arguing that “funeral attendees are captive in a way that 
deserves the same recognition afforded the resident in his or her home, or the 
patient in a medical facility”).  But see Wells, supra note 239, at 231 (cautioning that 
extending the captive audience doctrine as described in Frisby on the grounds that 
funerals are “particularly unique and deserving of broader privacy protection” would 
be a “mistake”). 
 308. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213. 
 309. Id. at 1220. 
 310. See, e.g., St. David’s Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, 921 P.2d 
821, 830, 834 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming an injunctive order on the grounds 
that “the government has a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of one’s 
place of worship”); cf. Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 
1998) (per curiam) (upholding an ordinance that “prohibits all demonstration 
activity within a specified distance of health care facilities and places of worship 
without regard to the message conveyed”); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1232–
33 (8th Cir. 1971) (noting that the defendants do not have a right to “disrupt the 
church services of the plaintiffs”). 
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context of an individual receiving an unwelcome radio transmission 
while driving in his car rather than at his house,311 so the captive 
audience doctrine might not require that funerals in particular be 
targeted.  Further, the Phelps Court did not seem receptive to carving 
out a special exception for funerals.  For example, when Snyder 
claimed that the funeral setting presented unique circumstances,312 
the Court noted that “Westboro chose to stage its picketing at the 
Naval Academy, the Maryland State House, and Matthew Snyder’s 
funeral to increase publicity for its views,”313 as if the staged protests at 
each of these locations should be analyzed in the same way and the 
fact that one of these involved a funeral did not alter the analysis.314  
That the Court seems to be treating funerals no differently from 
other kinds of events might decrease the likelihood that the Court 
would recognize a captive audience exception for funerals.  Certainly, 
the Phelps Court made clear that it was not addressing the 
constitutionality of a content-neutral picketing law and suggested that 
such a law might pass muster.315  Nonetheless, the Court went out of its 
way to note that there have been “a few limited situations where the 
location of targeted picketing can be regulated under provisions that 
the Court has determined to be content neutral.”316  Such a comment 
suggests that a content-neutral statute limiting funeral picketing 
might not pass muster after all because there have been only a few 
limited situations in which content-neutral statutes limiting targeting 
picketing have been upheld.317  
4. Phelps’s impact on the regulation of funeral picketing 
The Phelps Court seems to intentionally provide no direction to 
lower courts.  While the Court made clear that the damage award at 
issue could not stand, one cannot tell from the opinion whether 
content-neutral funeral protest restrictions pass muster as a 
reasonable time, place, manner restriction or, perhaps, on a captive 
audience rationale.  Further, legislators wishing to draft or amend 
                                                          
 311. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 730 (1978).  
 312. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1217 (“Snyder goes on to argue that Westboro’s speech 
should be afforded less than full First Amendment protection ‘not only because of 
the words’ but also because the church members exploited the funeral . . . .”). 
 313. Id. 
 314. Cf. Wells, supra note 239, at 231 (arguing that funerals should not be singled 
out for special treatment). 
 315. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1218 (“[Content neutral picketing laws] raise very 
different questions from the tort verdict at issue in this case.”). 
 316. Id. (emphasis added). 
 317. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding an ordinance that 
banned targeting picketing of a home). 
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legislation in this area might well feel frustrated.  One cannot tell 
whether such legislation would be more likely to pass muster by 
protecting funerals in particular, because such statutes would be 
more narrowly tailored,318 or whether legislation that protected 
religious services from interruption as a general matter would be 
more likely to pass muster because it would be less plausible to 
believe that the legislation was targeting unpopular speech.319 
Suppose that a state statute specifically restricting funeral protests 
is held to pass constitutional muster.320  A separate question is 
whether the Court would permit the imposition of damages for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress under such 
circumstances.321  
Certainly, the picketing at issue would not be protected by the First 
Amendment in that ex hypothesi the protesters would have violated a 
constitutionally-valid law.  But that would not settle the question at 
hand.  Presumably, when upholding the validity of the content-
neutral statute, the Court would say that “an incidental burden on 
speech is no greater than is essential . . . so long as the neutral 
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be 
achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”322  However, the Court 
would presumably fear that any intentional infliction of damages 
would turn “on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, 
rather than any interference with the funeral itself.”323  While the 
Court has not always rejected imposing a penalty on speech that was 
at least in part motivated by the content of the speech,324 the Court 
has struck down a law penalizing speech on the basis of content, even 
though that speech could have been punished under a content-
neutral statute.325  As the R.A.V. Court noted, “the power to proscribe 
                                                          
 318. Cf. Phelps-Roper v. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612, 619 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (“As to 
the fixed buffer zone, the Court finds that the statute is not substantially broader 
than necessary to achieve the State of Ohio’s legitimate interest in protecting its 
citizens from unwanted communications while they attend a funeral or burial 
service.”) 
 319. See Lauren M. Miller, Comment, A Funeral for Free Speech?  Examining the 
Constitutionality of Funeral Picketing Acts, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1097, 1127 (2007) (claiming 
that the “purpose and function” of the funeral picketing statutes is “to silence the 
unpopular viewpoints of a small sect of religious outsiders”). 
 320. See Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 358 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding 
Ohio Funeral Procession Provision). 
 321. See Brownstein & Amar, supra note 35, at 386–87 (advocating that such 
damages be potentially awarded when the defendant had violated a constitutionally 
permissible law prohibiting funeral picketing). 
 322. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985). 
 323. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011). 
 324. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978) (acknowledging that the 
Commission’s objections were based, in part, on the content of the broadcast). 
 325. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down an ordinance 
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particular speech on the basis of a noncontent element, like noise, 
does not entail the power to proscribe the same speech on the basis 
of a content element.”326  Thus, merely because funeral protesting 
might be subject to sanction because violating  a content-neutral 
time, place, or manner statute does not establish  that the Court 
would uphold tort damages for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress based on the outrageous content of the comments made at 
the funeral, assuming that the comments involved matters of public 
concern.  This means that even those violating the statute might not 
be subject to tort liability for the content of their speech. 
At least two issues would be implicated in such a case.  First, merely 
because a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction had 
been violated would not mean that local law also permitted a tort 
action to be brought based on that violation.  Second, even if local 
law did permit such an action,327 it is not clear after Phelps whether 
any tort award based on that violation would be upheld.   
The Phelps Court emphasized that it “was what Westboro said that 
exposed it to tort damages,”328 and that “any distress occasioned by 
Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the 
message conveyed, rather than any interference with the funeral 
itself.”329  But even if interference with the funeral was added to the 
facts of Phelps, a potential difficulty would still exist—that damages 
would have been imposed because the jury disagreed with the speech, 
not because the jury believed it was outrageous to stage a protest at a 
funeral.  So, too, local law affording a tort remedy under these 
circumstances might not allay the Court’s worry that an award could 
be based on the jury’s disagreement with the message rather than on 
its belief that funerals should not be disturbed. 
                                                          
punishing cross burning because it targeted speech, even though those burning a 
cross in someone’s yard could have been prosecuted under other ordinances, for 
example against outdoor fires in city limits. See id. at 385.  
 326. Id. at 386 (1992). 
 327. See, e.g., Chelsea Brown, Student Work, Not Your Mother’s Remedy:  A Civil 
Action Response to the Westboro Baptist Church’s Military Funeral Demonstrations, 112 W. 
VA. L. REV. 207, 234 (2009) (“Mississippi enacted legislation, in addition to its 
criminal penalties, allowing any surviving member of the deceased’s family who is 
damaged or threatened with loss or injury by reason of a violation to sue for 
damages, so long as there is credible evidence that a person violated or is likely to 
violate the state’s prohibition against disruptive protest at a funeral service within 
one hour before, during, or after the service.”). 
 328. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1219. 
 329. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Phelps raises more questions than it answers.  The Court explained 
that tort damages for nondefamatory speech on matters of public 
concern could not be awarded without offending constitutional 
guarantees.  But the Court did not make clear which, if any, factors 
were dispositive, so it is difficult to determine whether—or to what 
extent—the case has import for either tort or First Amendment law. 
One understanding of the opinion is that the case is not 
particularly noteworthy.  At issue was quiet and orderly speech on a 
matter of public concern.  The protest, which did not interrupt the 
funeral, complied with the directions of the police.  When 
characterized this way, the case seems to involve political speech that 
took place in accord with local law and so should not, of course, be 
subject to tort damages.  Many political statements are taken to heart 
and may cause real emotional harm,330 and the Court does not want 
to permit tort law to chill speech on important matters. 
Yet, there are other ways to understand the decision that may make 
it a watershed opinion.  While the Phelps Court suggested that its 
holding was “narrow,”331 the Court did not do a particularly good job 
in limiting the applicability of the decision.  The Court noted, for 
example, that Snyder did not see the content of the signs on the way 
to the funeral.332  But suppose that he had, and the content of the 
signs was so distracting that Snyder’s mind was reeling both during 
and after the funeral.  Would that be enough to change the holding 
even though the speech would have occurred in a public place on 
matters of public concern?  After all, as the Court pointed out, 
speech can “inflict great pain.”333  By the same token, it is uncertain 
whether the Court would uphold content-neutral funeral protest 
limitations and, even if it did, whether the Court would uphold tort 
liability for the violation of such a statute by protesters discussing 
matters of public concern.  
An additional question is whether Phelps has implications for the 
intersection of tort and First Amendment law more generally.  The 
Phelps Court implied that liability could not be imposed because the 
                                                          
 330. See id. at 1220 (“Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to action, move them 
to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain.”) 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. at 1213–14. 
 333. Id. at 1220. 
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speech at issue involved matters of public concern.334  But if speech 
on matters of public concern can be immunized in the funeral 
protest context, then one must wonder whether matters of public 
concern will now be trumpeted in other contexts as well.  For 
example, this could be a signal that the Court wishes to resurrect 
Rosenbloom, its overruling of the case in Gertz notwithstanding,335 and 
require actual malice in all defamation cases involving matters of 
public concern, whether or not the plaintiff is a public figure.  
The Court’s suggestion that some matters not of public concern 
were not actionable because “the overall thrust and dominant 
theme . . . spoke to broader public issues”336 cannot help but confuse 
the current jurisprudence.  One cannot tell, for example, whether 
the Court is signaling that speech on a matter of public concern, if 
predominating, will immunize actionable speech on matters of purely 
private concern, as long as the former speech is not offered to 
insulate the latter.337  This would be a significant change in the 
current jurisprudence.  As Justice Alito suggests, the “First 
Amendment allows recovery for defamatory statements that are 
interspersed with nondefamatory statements on matters of public 
concern.”338  If, indeed, the Phelps family’s comments on matters of 
purely private concern would have been actionable but for their 
comments on matters of public concern, it is not clear 
jurisprudentially why their comments on matters of public concern 
should have had an immunizing effect.  
One must also wonder whether Phelps has implications for the 
constitutional limitations on awards in non-defamation cases.  In the 
past, the Court has refused to preclude liability merely because the 
speech at issue involved a matter of public concern.339  One cannot 
tell, however, whether the Phelps holding has implications for a case 
like Zacchini—perhaps even a case involving unjust enrichment would 
be barred if it involves a publication on a matter of public concern.  
Or, perhaps, Phelps is not intended to apply to tort damages where 
defamation is not at issue.340  Indeed, it is not clear whether an unjust 
                                                          
 334. Id. at 1215. 
 335. See supra Part II.A.2–3. 
 336. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217. 
 337. Cf. id. (“We are not concerned in this case that Westboro’s speech on public 
matters was in any way contrived to insulate speech on a private matter from 
liability.”). 
 338. See id. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 339. See supra notes 171–76 and accompanying text. 
 340. Defamation was at issue in Phelps at the trial level, where the trial court held 
that there was no defamation as a matter of law.  See supra note 27 and accompanying 
text. 
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enrichment action against funeral protesters would pass 
constitutional muster, assuming that the elements of the tort were 
met under local law. 
Some may celebrate the open-ended nature of Phelps, because it 
can be read as either being quite consistent with the pre-existing 
jurisprudence or as effecting a sea-change in the jurisprudence.  But 
lower courts seeking guidance from the Court cannot help but feel 
frustrated.  Not only has the Court failed to tell them which factors 
are important in funeral protest cases in particular, but the Court has 
virtually extended an invitation to lower courts to modify the existing 
jurisprudence.  Consequently, a relatively clear area of the law is 
likely to become more, rather than less, confused.  While the result in 
Phelps may have been correct, the opinion itself has the potential to 
be a source of much regret. 
 
